If the goal of such questions is to prevent more aid workers from dying in future, this line of inquiry is counter-productive at this stage. I sincerely doubt the British government would have green-lighted the military option had Ms. Norgrove’s life not been in extreme danger. Hostage rescue is extremely high risk and there is always a possibility that the person or persons you are attempting to free could be killed during an operation, especially in a dangerous location like Kunar (parts of which are so untameable that US forces withdrew from them earlier this year). Instead of pinning blame on the rescuing party, a more useful question is why are aid workers being encouraged to come to Afghanistan when they are such obvious targets?

Militants in Afghanistan make no distinction between foreign NGOs and NATO soldiers. It doesn’t matter that aid workers are operating in a humanitarian rather than a military capacity. As far as the Taliban are concerned, anyone working on behalf of the coalition is the enemy. The US and British governments know this to be the case, yet they still rely on NGOs to help implement the coalition’s counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

No place for Aid workers

The idea of using NGOs as “implementing partners” sounds good in theory; the military clears the area of insurgents and the aid workers follow up with development projects to win the support of locals. In practice though, this strategy falls down on two major counts. Firstly, the coalition isn’t fighting a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, it’s embroiled in a civil war. As I’ve pointed out in previous posts, having taken sides in that civil war, NATO hasn’t a prayer of winning the hearts and minds of Afghans on the other side of the divide no matter how many hydro-electric plants, girls’ schools, roads, canals and health clinics it builds.

The second and more devastating drawback of using implementing partners is that it destroys the firewall between military and non-military personnel working in Afghanistan; hence why the Taliban regard aid workers as an extension of coalition forces rather than a separate, neutral entity. The aid organization Ms. Norgrove was working for at the time of her abduction was Development Alternatives Inc, an NGO operating in Afghanistan on behalf of USAID. This association left her incredibly vulnerable. Indeed, DAI had already lost two foreign employees and a number of local workers when its offices in Northern Afghanistan were targeted by suicide bombers in July.

In the wake of that attack and the death of British aid worker Dr. Karen Woo in August, not to mention a rash of foreign journalist abductions, you’d think the FCO would advise against all travel to Afghanistan just as it has for Somalia (a country which security wise is on par with Afghanistan in my opinion). Yet incredibly, the FCO has banned travel in only certain regions of Afghanistan and has advised against all but ‘essential’ travel in others.

Politics should not dictate the FCO’s security recommendations but I suspect that is exactly what is happening here. So I’d like to offer a reality check. The security situation in Afghanistan has been steadily declining since 2004. In the past three years, it’s nosedived even in areas that were once considered relatively secure. I for one wouldn’t take a client outside Kabul at this time because the situation has grown so untenable that I cannot possibly provide them with proactive security. The best I can do is react to an attack. And as any security professional worth their salt will tell you, that’s just not good enough.

Politics aside, aid workers also need to keep in mind that they are soft-abduction targets in a country where kidnapping foreigners is a lucrative trade. It was reported that Linda Norgrove was the only long-term expatriate employee among 200 Afghans at her base location. How well were those local hires vetted? Who among them knew Ms. Norgrove would be traveling to Kunar that day, and who knew at the other end in Kunar? These questions may be politically inconvenient. They are undoubtedly politically incorrect. But they need to be asked.

Linda Norgrove died trying to make Afghanistan a better place. The loss of such a selfless and dedicated individual is beyond tragic. I hope something at long last is learned from it. The FCO and the US State Department should stop encouraging foreign NGOs to come to Afghanistan until the ground is genuinely secured. Until then, foreign aid workers be advised: you are a target.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel, a modern-day Afghan war adventure-thriller is out now. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Ali Siddiqui’s Mahvash & Jahangir Siddiqui Foundation is one moderate group trying to help. Siddiqui discusses what’s happening on the ground and the threat of extremism. (You can make flood relief donations through the Mahvash & Jahangir Siddiqui Foundation here.)

Click here to view the embedded video.

Click here to view the embedded video.

Domestically, the PSC disbandment makes tremendous sense for Karzai. It will shift the balance of power away from warlords raising and operating private militias under the auspices of commercial security. These PSCs cum private armies have made millions servicing commercial and western military contracts (money which inevitably trickles down to the Taliban in the form of road taxes and other extortion schemes that keep the country’s off-the-books economy running). Come 2014, when Afghan forces are expected to take charge of the nation’s security, the last thing Karzai wants is to have dozens of well-funded private armies plotting his overthrow. In the interim, the PSC crackdown will also give Karzai a PR boost with voters ahead of Parliamentary elections, but this is more of a fringe benefit than a driving motive. After all, when it comes to listening to the electorate, Karzai’s track record is less than stellar.

Afghan Private Security

On the international front, the decree has reminded Karzai’s western allies that he can hold them to ransom whenever he chooses. Under the order, foreign security contractors will lose their residency permits and be confined to working inside foreign government and NGO compounds. Exterior security – which includes vehicle moves normally coordinated by close protection teams – will be handed over to the Afghan National Police. Pity the diplomats and aid workers. I certainly couldn’t sleep in a compound wondering whether the ANP standing watch outside my wall are Taliban infiltrators or undisciplined hacks who will turn tail and run the moment they’re attacked.

I imagine some foreign security companies in Afghanistan are flapping right now. I do hope they aren’t considering skirting the order by having their people on the ground work without weapons or armoured vehicles. That would be negligent and endanger both their employees and their clients.

The greater fallout of course is the impact the decree could have on NATO forces. There are not enough soldiers in Afghanistan to guard military supply convoys so the task (along with many other logistical roles) has been outsourced to PSCs. Under Karzai’s plan, these contracts would revert to the Afghan Interior Ministry. General Petreaus might want to consider appointing a special liaison in charge of ‘facilitating payments’ if he ever wants to see his kit again.

NATO shouldn’t let that happen nor should western governments entrust the security of their diplomats to the ANP. It could explain Karzai’s completely unrealistic deadline on the order (a convenient loophole to draw the transition out indefinitely). If it does turn out to be a bluff, NATO should still take heed. With a single pen stroke, Karzai has laid bare the vulnerabilities that result from outsourcing military tasks to the commercial sector. Sure, it may help governments in the short term by enabling them to hide the true financial and human costs of the war in Afghanistan. In the long-run however, outsourcing has the potential to cripple NATO’s entire military campaign.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel, a modern-day Afghan war adventure-thriller is out now. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Now in his new novel The Infidel he tells the story of two British soldiers caught up in deadly political intrigues. A modern-day retelling of Rudyard Kipling’s The Man Who Would Be King, it takes place, like its 19th-century predecessor, in Afghanistan’s remote Nuristan province where Shepherd spent time.

In this interview, Shepherd discusses The Infidel as well as the realities of the war in Afghanistan in 2010.

The Prime Minister’s inner suck-up reared its head early on when he allowed four US Senators to hijack the agenda. Ahead of the trip, the Senators had pressed for a meeting to discuss their call for an investigation into the release of the Lockerbie bomber; a request Mr. Cameron’s office initially rebuffed by offering to have Britain’s ambassador to the US meet with them instead. Within hours of landing however, Mr. Cameron flip-flopped and agreed to sit down with the gang.

The point here is not whether the issue was worth discussing but rather who was worthy of raising it with our Prime Minister. I bet Margaret Thatcher wouldn’t have rearranged her schedule to kowtow a bunch of lower ranking American statesmen riding a wave of British bashing ahead of a mid-term election.

The chummy joint press conference between the Prime Minister and President Obama tried to gloss over any disparities between the two leaders. But the pretence of equality was soon dashed by none other than the Prime Minister himself when he gave his view of US-British relations to an American television presenter. ‘We were the junior partner in 1940 when we were fighting against Hitler. We are the junior partner now.’ The United States didn’t enter the war until 1941. But Mr. Cameron did more than embarrass the history departments of Eton and Oxford. He belittled what was arguably Britain’s finest hour and betrayed the public trust by demeaning the nation before a foreign audience.

The Barack and Dave Show

I’m not arguing that Britain can match the US in economic size or military strength. As I’ve said before, we’re not a superpower. But that doesn’t mean our Prime Minister should tell America we’re inferior to them. Given the sacrifice of British blood and treasure in Afghanistan and Iraq, Mr. Cameron’s words are all the more offensive. If we’re so ‘junior’ let another, more ‘senior’ country stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the Yanks and we’ll bring our troops home.

I had hoped that when the new coalition took power, Britain’s government would grow a backbone and start putting our national interest ahead of America’s. Sadly though, David Cameron has shown that when it comes to playing lapdog, he’s no different than his labour predecessors.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel will be published August 5th by Simon & Schuster UK. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Click here to view the embedded video.

I cannot begin to imagine the hell that Bill Shaw has been through. By all accounts he is a manager of impeccable integrity who believed he had paid a legitimate fine to a member of the NDS, Afghanistan’s intelligence agency. In fact, it was his attempt to obtain a receipt for the payment that resulted in his arrest and incarceration. Sadly, Mr. Shaw learned the hard way what happens to honest men in Afghanistan. He spent four months in Kabul’s notorious Pul-i-Charki prison alongside murderers, Taliban and hardcore jihadists who put a $10,000 bounty on his head.

Free thanks to his family.

Bill Shaw is not the first westerner to get caught in a web of Afghan dirty dealing nor will he be the last. Extortion, blackmail and kidnapping are endemic in the country and western security contractors, journalists and aid workers are considered rich targets. And it’s not just shady officials, crooked police officers and hooded kidnapper who pose a threat. Sometimes westerners are scammed by the ‘trusted’ local Afghan employee working alongside them (The same court that acquitted Bill Shaw found his Afghan colleague, Maiwand Limar, guilty of conspiring to defraud him).

I’m not surprised by what the Afghans did to Bill Shaw. I am however deeply, deeply disturbed that his employer and the British government allowed him to endure such a nightmare. ArmorGroup, the G4S subsidiary which employs Bill Shaw has been operating in Afghanistan since 2002. The company provides close protection and site-security for commercial, non-government and government clients including Britain’s FCO. ArmorGroup has hit some serious bumps along the way, including having a British manager shot dead during a cash-in-transit move back in 2007. In short, the firm is intimately familiar with the pitfalls of doing business in the country. The Afghans don’t play by the same rules as the west. The NDS does not have proper accounting systems to track ‘fine’ payments which mysteriously vanish into thin air. The senior managers above Bill Shaw should have understood the Pandora ’s Box he was opening when he went back to the NDS for a receipt. In my view, had they taken over the scenario earlier, events may very well have not spiralled out of control. After what Bill Shaw’s been through, ArmorGroup should make sure he never has to work another day of his life.

ArmorGroup let Bill Shaw down in my opinion. But their failure is nothing compared to the FCO which never should have allowed him to spend a single night in jail. The FCO is well aware of the flaws in Afghanistan’s judicial system because British tax payers partially fund it. The Afghan legal system does not serve the law imposed on it by the West. Like all institutions in the country, it is a pawn of powerful interests. I firmly believe the Afghan courts convicted Bill Shaw in order to curb western criticism of the country’s endemic corruption.

Why did the FCO stand by and let Bill Shaw get railroaded? I’d very much like an official answer to that question. My gut feeling is that the FCO was so focused on the greater political picture they didn’t think he was worth fighting for—that is until his family launched a high profile petition and social-networking campaign to draw attention to his plight. Shaw’s wife and daughter fought tooth and nail to make the British government stand up and listen. They even marched petitions up to Downing Street.

Bill Shaw’s family deserve every credit for his release. But not every British citizen jailed in Afghanistan has a vocal support network back home. As I write this, Anthony Malone, an ex-British soldier who went to Afghanistan in 2002 to set up a security and logistics business languishes in Pul-i-Chakri prison. Malone has already served more than two years in jail for ‘non-payment of debt’ which is NOT a criminal offence in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, Malone recently told a reporter from the Daily Mail he’s been ‘abandoned’ by the British Embassy. Why the hell hasn’t the FCO demanded his freedom?

Cowering behind excuses of ‘diplomacy’ just won’t cut it; especially when the British government encourages British businesses to come to Afghanistan. As the experiences of Bill Shaw and Anthony Malone demonstrate, no matter how much blood and treasure Britain squanders, Afghans will never embrace the institutions imposed on them by the West. It’s time for the British government to acknowledge the limitations of what it can achieve in Afghanistan before another innocent Brit like Bill Shaw is thrown to the wolves.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel will be published August 5th by Simon & Schuster UK. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

First, let’s separate the military brass from the brave soldiers doing the hard graft on the ground. The British produce the finest soldiers in the world. I have no doubt our forces could hang on in Sangin indefinitely, as the Paras proved in 2006 during the opening phase of Britain’s woefully undermanned and infamously underequipped deployment to Helmand. Sadly, the number of boots on the ground was never increased sufficiently to allow British forces to dominate their area of operations; hence why they have managed to ‘hang on’ rather than turn the situation around.

They'll Take the Aid...

If anyone has failed in Sangin it is Britain’s military and political leaders. They never should have sent our forces to Helmand in the first place, let alone in such unrealistic numbers. As mentioned in previous posts, NATO troops aren’t fighting an insurgency in Afghanistan; they’ve taken sides in a long term civil war. The Brits never had a hope in hell of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in Sangin because the local Pashtoon population believe NATO forces and the Afghan National Army for that matter, are allied with the former warlords of the Northern Alliance – the historic enemies of the Pashtoon. Furthermore, British troops in Sangin were also unwittingly thrust into the centre of more localized rivalries between tribes and drugs lords; a scenario which has unfortunately played out in many other areas of Afghanistan as well.

In the last few months, the British media has started analyzing the Afghan quagmire with an increasingly wary eye. The late awakening is understandable, given that for years the FCO has been feeding journalists a steady diet of ‘good news’ stories about ‘flourishing markets’, health clinics, and school openings in Sangin. The Pashtoon aren’t going to turn down a health clinic, even one provided by the allies of their mortal enemies. They’ll grab the aid money with one hand…but hold a dagger in the other.

The Americans will deploy to Sangin in greater numbers than the British. They’ll likely be better equipped and supported as well. I doubt however that these advantages will make their mission more successful. I’ve said it before but it bears repeating: more troops equals more causalities in Afghanistan. That’s the tragic reality of entering a conflict on one side of a civil war.

I’m over-the-moon that British forces are withdrawing from Sangin and redeploying to an area more conducive to their current force strength. There is absolutely no shame in that. It’s a sensible move. Of course, it would be an even better move if British forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan all together.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel will be published August 5th by Simon & Schuster UK. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Anticipating the flood of public doubt surrounding Britain’s continued involvement, the new coalition government responded to this terrible landmark by once again linking Afghanistan to national security. ‘We are paying a high price for keeping our country safe,’ said Prime Minister David Cameron. ‘We are there because the Afghans are not yet ready to keep their own country safe and to keep terrorists and terrorist training camps out of their country.’ This, as regular readers of my posts will know, is a bogus argument in my view. If anything, Britain’s military presence in Afghanistan has compromised national security by fanning the flames of home grown terrorism. As for making the world a safer place; I’ve said since 2001 that Britain and its allies would do better to tackle al-Qaeda at its source by hitting select targets in Pakistan (al-Qaeda’s primary breeding ground) and Saudi Arabia (al-Qaeda’s financial centre). Going after terrorists one by one in Afghanistan is tantamount to swatting mosquitoes to eradicate malaria.

Can he be won over?

Those who support ‘staying the course’ in Afghanistan believe the coalition can eventually succeed in its mission to bring security and stability to the country. This misperception is not surprising given that for years now, the public has been told that Britain and its allies are waging a counter-insurgency campaign. Indeed I have been sucked into calling the conflict an insurgency. I apologize for doing so and I’d like to be perfectly clear now: Britain is not fighting counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. We have taken sides in a festering 30-year civil war. This distinction is crucial for understanding the limits of what can be achieved there. A foreign force can win a counter-insurgency by getting the people in its area of operations on side. By contrast, British and US forces operating in Pashtoon dominated Southern and Eastern Afghanistan have no chance of winning over the local population because the coalition has allied itself with the former commanders of the Northern Alliance – the mortal enemies of the Pashtoon.

Having worked for six years as a security advisor in Afghanistan, I’ve had contact with locals ranging from humble villagers to cunning warlords. When pressed, they have all come to the same dire conclusion. It doesn’t’ matter when the coalition withdraws from Afghanistan, the end result will be the same; brutal, all-out civil war. Bear in mind too that it’s not just the coalition that have taken sides in the Afghan conflict. India, Pakistan and China all have a presence in the country whether through proxies or exploiting the country’s vast mineral wealth. Russia and Iran are also working behind-the-scenes to secure their interests. That’s five regional powers – all with nuclear weapons or close to it, vying to assert their will in Afghanistan. No matter how you look at it, Afghanistan is a quagmire that defies military solutions.

It’s entirely possible to support our troops in Afghanistan and be against the war. Britain’s armed forces deserve to be honoured for their service and sacrifice. The fact that they were able to hold out in Helmand for years despite being woefully undermanned and ill-equipped is testament to their skill and prowess. They could fight on in Afghanistan indefinitely if that’s what this country asks of them. But make no mistake: achieving Afghan stability is a mission no foreign army, no matter how professional, can accomplish.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel will be published August 5th by Simon & Schuster UK. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.