Although a year has passed since Iran’s contested presidential election, it is still up for debate what exactly happened in the aftermath. Juan Cole discusses the controversy in a recent blog post. The Week in Green has been closely tracking the political situation in Iran. This piece covers a protest six months after the election, giving a sense of the size and scale of the protest demonstrations.

It has been a year since Iran’s last presidential election, the highly disputed poll in which authorities claimed the conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defeated the reformist challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi. The results, which most observers believe were manipulated, set off a wave of protests that continue to this day. One of the programs that tracked the increasingly dangerous situation, using footage that was smuggled out, was The Week in Green. As this overview documenting the movement from June 2009 to February 2010 shows, the protests continued long after the election.

After four years, the British media have finally got it. This week, the Times published a two month investigation into who was responsible for the disastrous decision to deploy British forces to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in insufficient numbers back in 2006. The answer was in the headline: The Officer’s Mess.

Of course, today it is obvious to a blind man that the Helmand mission was poorly planned and woefully undermanned. Nearly three hundred brave British soldiers have lost their lives in Southern Afghanistan and many have sustained horrific, life-altering wounds. But as far back as 2004 and certainly by 2005, it was clear to anyone who visited the province that it would never be pacified by a token occupying force.

In spring 2004, I escorted a media client to Helmand. We didn’t fly. We drove from Kabul to Lashkar Gah. Traveling unilaterally outside the security bubble of a military embed was a real eye opener. We found a poppy field growing outside the Governor’s mansion and Taliban frolicking on a nearby riverbank. It was no mystery who had the run of the place. In my conversations with locals, the disdain for foreign forces in Afghanistan was palpable. They warned that Helmand would put up fierce resistance if the coalition stepped up its campaign. I knew then that Helmand would be no walk-over.

Talib in Helmand, 2004

The outrageous thing is I wasn’t alone in my thinking. The Times investigation detailed how senior military chiefs and civil servants ignored multiple warnings that Britain was grossly underestimating the challenges it would face in Helmand. As one ‘senior serving officer who asked not to be named’ told The Times, ‘We who had bothered to put a bit of work in and had done the estimate realized that we needed much more than we were being given.’

The Times suggests that some military chiefs were putting politics ahead of sound military planning. I can’t say I’m surprised. Back in 2005 and early 2006, the prevailing mood was that all was going swimmingly in Afghanistan; a view I challenged frequently in conversations with military based there. Helmand was a particularly volatile subject. My argument that it was a mistake for British troops to deploy to the province was usually greeted with a mixture of denial, caution and/or veiled anger. Team players, it seemed, didn’t express such opinions.

I’ve said it before and it bears repeating now: generals who drop their pants for politicians don’t win military campaigns. The senior brass who signed off on the Helmand mission and those who remained silent after it was abundantly clear mistakes had been made should be held accountable. It is inconceivable to me that former Army Heads General Sir Mike Jackson and General Sir Richard Dannatt retired to lucrative consulting careers with chests full of medals and strings of letters after their names. I for one would like to see them stripped of their titles and medals which is generous considering that two hundred years ago, their tenures may well have ended with blindfolds and shots fired at dawn.

It’s too late for retired military brass to make amends as far as I’m concerned. But senior serving officers can still stand up and be counted — and that doesn’t include giving anonymous quotes to the press. If a senior officer believes that the soldiers he commands are being sacrificed to poor planning, he can and should resign on the spot. During the Falklands campaign, my squadron commander resigned in protest over a scenario that would have killed his men needlessly. The scenario was corrected and the squadron lived to fight another day. In 23 years of military service, it was the only instance I can recall in which a Rupert put his men before his career. He didn’t get an official title for his troubles, but his men awarded him one: HERO.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel will be published August 5th by Simon & Schuster UK. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

This week Chancellor George Osborne unveiled £6.2 billion in public spending cuts; the first round in what is expected to be a deep and painful austerity program to rein in Britain’s £156 billion deficit. According to Osborne, the government is targeting ‘wasteful spending.’ If waste is truly in the crosshairs, I’d like to put forth a glaringly obvious proposal that will save Britain billions now and in the future. Withdraw our troops from Afghanistan.

Sadly, arguing the case for withdrawal on the basis of British lives lost — both men and women in uniform and private security contractors working in Afghanistan — has thus far failed to convince the government to rethink its policy. Public pressure hasn’t hit critical mass. Perhaps too many voters feel the conflict has no impact on their day-to-day lives or they’ve been frightened by the government’s claims that Britain’s continued involvement in Afghanistan is necessary for safeguarding our national security. But where blood has failed to persuade, treasure may succeed, especially now that every man, woman and child in this country is living in the shadow of an £893.4 billion debt mountain.

The economic argument for pulling out of Afghanistan is compelling. An analysis by the Independent on Sunday estimated that by the middle of this year, the MoD will have spent £9 billion on Afghan operations; a figure that only accounts for logistical costs including wages, equipment and transport. When the Independent factored in ‘hidden costs’ such as support for injured troops, veterans and the families of soldiers killed in action, the figure climbed to £12 billion. And that’s just the bill so far. There are also long-term costs associated with the Afghan campaign, for example, the on-going care of wounded veterans and soldiers suffering from PTSD. Consider too that the MoD isn’t the only British presence in Afghanistan. The Foreign Office and British development agencies have poured tens of millions of pounds into the Afghan black hole.

Again, the naysayers will argue that Britain needs to stay the course in Afghanistan to protect our shores from terrorists. As I’ve argued before, Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan has stoked home grown terrorism and compromised our future defence capabilities by forcing the MoD to gut the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to free up cash for operations. It’s also a mistake to view national security exclusively through the lens of counter-terrorism. Economic strength is equally vital. Right now, Britain is staring down the barrel of a sovereign debt downgrade that would boot it out of the premier league of world economies. And while Britain continues to spend on Afghanistan, education budgets in this country are being slashed. The impact on our future competitiveness cannot be overstated. We need to give our children a running start; not rob them of a decent education and saddle them with a debt bomb.

Britain’s new Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, recently described Afghanistan as ‘a broken 13th century country.’ As much as I admire the Afghans for their toughness and cunning, I have to say I agree. Pouring good money after bad is not going to fix Afghanistan. But it will add to Britain’s already considerable economic woes.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. His debut novel The Infidel will be published August 5th by Simon & Schuster UK. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Remember the not-so-distant past when the word ‘corruption’ peppered every official US comment on Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government? Yet the ‘C’ word has been conspicuously absent during Karzai’s feel good tour of Washington this week. President Obama claimed that the ‘perceived tensions’ were ‘simply overstated’ – this despite the fact that as recently as last month, Karzai reportedly told a group of Afghan lawmakers that he should quit the political process and join the Taliban. So why have recriminations and threats suddenly been replaced by smiles and handshakes?

It has nothing to do with cleaning up corruption, that’s for sure. By all accounts, it’s still business as usual in Kabul and Karzai’s brother, an alleged drugs lord, is still living large in Kandahar. In my view, the Afghan President is being given the red carpet treatment not because of the ‘C’ word but because of the ‘D’ word – deadline.

Still on top

President Obama hopes to begin withdrawing US forces from Afghanistan by July 2011. Abandoning Karzai so late in the game would undoubtedly push this deadline back, something which would not go down well with US voters at a time when Obama will be gearing up for re-election. (Unlike Britain, US campaigning starts more than a year before voters actually go to the polls).

Karzai knows this all too well and true to form, he is manipulating the situation to his advantage. As I’ve said in previous blogs, Karzai is an astute man who can run rings around his western counterparts. It boggles the mind how in a matter of weeks he’s refocused the Afghan debate away from corruption and toward issues which can only bolster him back home: limiting civilian causalities and reconciling with the Taliban.

Carrot or stick, Karzai will do what is best for Karzai. And like a hard done by political wife, Obama is so invested in the Afghan President he has no choice but to stand by his man. But does Britain have to stand by him as well? Don’t forget, that while Karzai is being showered with affection in Washington, an innocent and upstanding British commercial security manager, Bill Shaw, languishes in a notorious Kabul jail.

Unlike President Obama, the new British Prime Minister David Cameron has just come through an election and is therefore in an outstanding position to shake up foreign policy. I personally would like the new PM to withdraw British troops from Afghanistan immediately. I doubt that’s on the cards though, so I’ll settle for demanding Mr. Shaw’s immediate release.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

New York City caught a break this week after a car bomb failed to detonate in Times Square. The alleged attacker, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-born American citizen, reportedly claimed he learned his terror craft at a training camp in North Waziristan, an insurgent stronghold in Pakistan’s tribal belt. America, Britain and Europe have understandably grown fearful of tribal belt insurgents exporting violent jihad to western shores and this latest incident has garnered considerable media attention, not to mention, a deluge of official reaction from some powerful players. Scary as Shahzad may be though, obsessing about a disgruntled, young militant with poor bomb-making skills strikes me as misplaced considering what’s really at stake in Pakistan.

Pakistani militants have made a much bigger mark on their home turf than they have abroad. Though Pakistan has long been accused of being soft on militants due to Afghan Taliban taking refuge within its borders, in recent years Islamabad has been contending with a growing wave of violence unleashed by the TTP, an umbrella group for the Pakistani Taliban. To the consternation of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the TTP isn’t concerned with driving western forces out of Afghanistan. Its goal is to topple Pakistan’s central government, abolish democracy (which it views as un-Islamic) and establish a Caliphate; in short, to shake Pakistan to its very foundations.

Could always be worse: At least he didn't have WMDs

Islamabad has responded to this challenge by launching several military offensives in the tribal belt where TTP is based. The fighting has been brutal and Pakistan’s military has taken heavy causalities. If it extends its campaign into North Waziristan (and there will undoubtedly be pressure from the West to do so after Times Square) the military’s resources will be stretched further still. Moreover, the fallout from these incursions is not confined to the tribal areas. The specter of Muslims killing Muslims has done much to enflame Pakistan’s considerable ethnic divisions. Throw in a long-running separatist movement in Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest and most resource rich province and what you have is a recipe for massive instability and civil unrest in a nuclear power. That is scary.

The Times Square bomber has been charged with terrorism and ‘attempting to detonate a weapon of mass destruction.’ Call me old fashioned, but I still think of WMD in terms of NBC -nuclear, biological and chemical; not FPG- fireworks, petrol and gas. Sadly though, my version of WMD did not receive as much coverage this week even though a review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is underway at the United Nations in New York.

Pakistan and its neighbor/arch nuclear rival India are not participating in the UN conference because neither country has signed the NPT. But they are there in spirit due to nuclear energy agreements; one between the US and India, another between China and Pakistan. Think of it as the post-Cold War version of mutually assured destruction: MAD by proxy, only more frightening because both India and Pakistan are dealing with considerable domestic unrest.

By enhancing Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear capabilities, China and the US are not only making a mockery of the NPT; if Iran realizes its nuclear ambitions, the stage will be set for a terrifying set of nuclear dominos. External agitation could be the trigger that sets them in motion but so too could internal strife. Diminishing – or better yet, dismantling those dominos is one of the most pressing security issues in the world today – one that deserves above-the-fold, front-page headlines.

Granted, Faisal Shahzad makes more interesting copy than a bunch of talking heads at the UN. But the escapades of an inept terrorist who left a trail of clues before deploying his failed fireworks display won’t seem nearly as significant if all hell breaks loose in South Asia.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Private security contractors working for Western PSCs in Kabul added another occupational hazard to their already considerable portfolio this week after Bill Shaw, a manager for Britain’s largest security firm was convicted of bribery by an Afghan court and sentenced to two years in prison. I have no doubt that Mr. Shaw was acting in good faith when he paid a $20,000 fine for the release of two improperly licensed vehicles owned by his employer, G4S; parent company of ArmorGroup. By all accounts, he is an upstanding manager who got caught in a political pissing match between Karzai’s government and the West over who is fuelling corruption in Afghanistan.

In light of the recent rows between Karzai and his western backers, the railroading of Mr. Shaw certainly smacks of the Afghan President getting a little of his own back. But harassment of foreign PSCs in Afghanistan is certainly nothing new. Since at least 2006, Afghan authorities have been stopping foreign contractors at police roadblocks, confiscating weapons, communications systems and vehicles, raiding security company compounds and arresting consultants on fabricated charges. Some have argued that such activities are needed to rein in rogue contractors. While a small minority of foreign security personnel in Afghanistan have behaved like cowboys, it’s my firm belief that the hounding of foreign PSCs has nothing to do with law enforcement and everything to do with lining the pockets of corrupt Afghans.

So-called ‘fines’ are just the tip of the iceberg. There are shed loads of cash to be made servicing commercial security contracts in Afghanistan and the country’s warlords and Generals who run their own local PSCs/militias have been trying to get rid of the foreign competition for years. As poor Bill Shaw discovered, that agenda has now converged with Karzai’s need to demonstrate that the international community is also to blame for corruption in his country.

Political Pawns?

The Times reported that Mr. Shaw cleared the fine with his head office in London before paying it and that immediately prior to his arrest; ‘someone’ suggested he ‘leave the country on a British military flight.’ Having managed commercial security teams in Afghanistan since 2004, I would have thought G4S’s managers in London would have insisted he leave the country the second he was called in for questioning. They were incredibly naïve in my view. There are no objective rules in Afghanistan. The Afghans make them up as they go along. After nine years, G4S and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which encourages British businesses to come to Afghanistan should know this. I hope both are playing hardball right now to secure Mr. Shaw’s release.

Of course, the real sting in the tail is that the judicial system that convicted Mr. Shaw is partially funded by the British tax payer. How can Britain continue to justify pouring money and troops into Afghanistan when men like Bill Shaw who are trying to facilitate business and development in the country are hung out to dry?

Finally, let’s not forget Maiwand Limar, the Afghan G4S employee who was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison alongside Bill Shaw. You can guarantee poor Mr. Limar won’t be enjoying any special treatment in Kabul’s notorious Pul-e-Charkhi prison. I hope G4S are working as hard to clear his name as they are Mr. Shaw’s and that both men’s families will be fully provided for while this political storm rages.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Last night’s leaders’ debate made it official; the future of Britain’s nuclear deterrent is the stand out issue of the election. Prime Minister Gordon Brown berated Liberal Democrat Leader Nick Clegg’s proposal to scrap the next generation Trident II nuclear missile system, telling him to ‘get real about the danger that we face,’ from Iran and North Korea. Conservative Leader David Cameron wasn’t as forceful but his message was on par with Brown’s. ‘We are safer having an independent nuclear deterrent in an unsafe and uncertain world,’ he argued.

I agree with the Lib Dems on this issue. Trident II is outdated and the world has moved on. Committing upwards of £80 billion on a weapons system designed for the Cold War at a time when we’re gutting the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy to pay for operations in Afghanistan could very well compromise our defensive capabilities more than it will enhance them. Invoking the specter of rogue states hitting the launch button is scare mongering in my view. Iran and North Korea are no threat to Britain. As I’ve argued before, the hazards we face are much closer to home; specifically internal terrorists such as radical British Muslims hell bent on turning this country into a Caliphate or the Real IRA and its affiliates. Twice in the last ten days dissident republicans have targeted a police station in Co Armagh with car bombs, putting Northern Ireland on its highest security alert in twelve years. Replacing our ballistic missile deterrent on a like-for-like basis won’t curb these types of threats.

Who's got the goods on nuclear deterrence?

Binning Trident II and scaling back to a minimal nuclear deterrent will however force Britain to reassess its role in the world. The question of Britain’s global might is at the heart of this debate and indeed our broader defence and foreign policy strategies. A survey out this week revealed that 88% of defense and security specialists think the UK needs a radical reassessment of the position it wants and is able to play in the world.

‘Little Britain’ has always liked to punch above its weight. Historically, it’s not our nuclear arsenal but our outstanding ground troops, arguably the best in the world that has enabled us to do this. The reputation of our armed forces has taken a beating in recent years with charges that the British army ran away from Basra and parts of Helmund. Any failures though were not the fault of our extremely professional soldiers. As far as I’m concerned, blame lies squarely with military and political leaders who placed our troops in impossible scenarios in insufficient numbers.

Britain can outperform in future provided we deploy our military assets more wisely and allocate our financial resources strategically. The criteria we use to commit our troops to overseas campaigns must change. We cannot jump every time America snaps its fingers. We need to assess whether there is a real threat to our national security and then proceed accordingly.

I think it is criminal we won’t have a strategic defense review until after the election. Right now, it won’t include Trident, but I hope that will change. I also hope a defense review will examine the impact of our military campaigns and broader foreign policies on home grown terrorism. The world is unsafe and it is uncertain. So let’s get real and stop clinging to outdated notions of what it will take to protect our shores.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

I applaud General Stanley McChrystal’s decision this week to withdraw US Forces from the Korengal Valley in the notorious Kunar-Nuristan corridor of Afghanistan. Even with roughly 150,000 troops soon at his disposal, it’s a brave call to abandon what was touted as an operationally important area—especially when the Taliban will undoubtedly claim the move as a victory. The pullback is being billed as part of a larger ‘repositioning’ of US and NATO forces to more populated areas of Afghanistan. Still, repositioning or not, some places cannot be dominated.

Eastern Afghanistan's Unforgiving Terrain

I speak from experience when I say that the Kunar-Nuristan corridor falls into that category. Back in 2007, I had occasion to travel to the region on a military embed with a small TV news crew. The embed took us from FOB Kala Gush in western Nuristan across to FOB Naray in Kunar and finally onto FOB Keating in eastern Nuristan. I have never in my entire life been to a military location as vulnerable as Camp Keating. Based at a junction of the Kunar River in a deep valley overlooked by sharp mountain peaks, the place was an insurgent’s Valhalla.

Militants could nest in a tree line or behind a boulder for days; studying the soldiers’ routines, working out the best time to strike. The poor troops stationed at Camp Keating were patrolling with eyes on stalks. FOB Keating’s mission at the time was provincial reconstruction and security sector reform; difficult tasks in any insurgent rich environment, let alone one with unforgiving terrain, ancient ethnic rivalries, lumber-smuggling syndicates and rampant xenophobia. I was never so happy to leave a base – and never so angry. I couldn’t believe any commander in their right mind would send great, young warriors to operate in such a location, especially when you consider that Soviet forces were hammered in Kunar-Nuristan during their ill-fated occupation. It was sheer lunacy. McChrystal’s predecessors were clearly not history buffs.

Camp Keating was abandoned late last year following the infamous ‘Battle of Kamdesh’ in which a large force of insurgents assaulted the outpost, killing 8 soldiers and wounding more than 20. The Yanks didn’t have an easy time in the Korengal Valley either. Known as Death Valley, it has claimed the lives of 42 American soldiers and wounded hundreds of others since 2005.

Concentrating troops in areas where they have a hope of dominating the ground is definitely a sounder strategy. Still, I think it’s too little too late. It certainly puts neighbouring Pakistan’s challenges into perspective as well. For years the West has criticized Pakistan for not doing enough to go after extremists on its side of the Durand Line—the historic border with Afghanistan. Now that Pakistan has launched multiple operations against insurgent strongholds in its border regions, it has every right to slate the West for not pulling its weight in Afghanistan.

So the Pakistanis have a legitimate grievance and the US will be accused of running away from Kunar-Nuristan. But at least McChrystal has taken his forces out of an impossible situation. Critics be damned.

Bob Shepherd is an ex-SAS soldier and bestselling author of The Circuit. To read more posts by him, please visit www.bobshepherdauthor.com.

Back in the early 2000s, I was living in Moscow, and as any Western expat in Russia knows, once a year you have to take a little trip. You have to travel to a Russian consulate in a foreign city and hope and pray the consulate officer will take pity on you, issue you a new visa, and not make your life a living hell. Most Westerners I knew traveled to Finland or the Baltics – at least they could suffer against the backdrop of civilized Europe. I guess I wanted to be different; I went to Kyrgyzstan.

I remember strolling off the plane in Bishkek alongside some US soldiers heading to the US’ Manas air base – installed in northern Kyrgyzstan shortly after 9/11 to aid the war in Afghanistan. I was wearing flip flops and shorts, and my friend Tom, a Peace Corp volunteer who’d come to pick me up, shook his head. “I can’t believe you wore flip flops to Kyrgyzstan!”

Kyrgyz National Hat... Atop a Bus Stop

He took me first to the Russian consulate. I knew things weren’t going well when I confused the name of Bishkek’s main avenue “Prospekt Chui” with a Russian swear word. The consulate officer looked at me like I was crazy, and then let it be known that, unless I shelled out $1000, I’d be staying in Bishkek for a month – which I ended up doing.

So Tom and I jumped on a marshrutka – a crowded, sweaty commercial passenger van – to Lake Issyk Kul, Kyrgyzstan’s main tourist attraction. It’s the fourth largest lake in the world, and apparently Boris Yeltsin used to vacation there. On the way, we passed numerous billboards showing then-President Askar Akayev smiling paternally.

Akayev was considered a relatively liberal leader by Central Asia standards. He wasn’t an autocratic like his counterparts in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. Sure he stacked the government with family members and made a number of personally lucrative business deals, but hey, this was Central Asia.

Before getting to Issyk Kul, the marshrutka stopped at a convenient store. Tom and I took the opportunity to relieve ourselves out in the woods. When we walked back to the van, two Kyrgyz police officers stopped us. “What were you doing down there,” they asked, chuckling. “Come with us!” They brought us into a wooden shed with nothing but a rusty metal table. This must have functioned as the local police precinct, and it seemed the perfect place for two naïve Americans to get their butts kicked.

We got off with a $20 fine, and back on the marshrutka, Tom said, “Man, we were really lucky. They do whatever the f&@# they want out here!” “What do you mean they do whatever the f&@# they want out here?” I needed some clarification on this point. Then Tom told me a story I’d never forget.

“One day,” he said, “I was walking around outside Bishkek, when a Kyrgyz man galloped up to me on a horse. He took out a whip and started whipping me. I tried to run away, but he chased me around for over three hours. By the grace of god, I ran into a family on a picnic, or he would have kept on chasing me forever… Yeah, they do whatever the f&@# they want out here.”

Shortly after I left Kyrgyzstan, the so-called “Tulip Revolution” toppled Akayev and brought Kurmankbek Bakiyev to power. It was the last of a wave of US-backed uprisings that attempted to infuse post-Soviet republics with democratic values and western leanings.

And what did Bakiyev do? You guessed it: whatever the f&@# he wanted. He turned out to be even more authoritarian and crooked than Akayev. He played off the Americans against the Russians to get an increase in rent on Manas. He spread the funds – and key government posts – to his family and friends, and then sat back and watched as consumer energy prices rose and rose – the one issue everyday Kyrgyz really care about.

- Ivan Weiss